


Example: Mixed Strategy Nash

Game Theory Course:
Jackson, Leyton-Brown & Shoham

Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks

- Mixed strategies in sports and competitive games




Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks

- Mixed strategies in sports and competitive games
- Be unpredictable



Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks

- Mixed strategies in sports and competitive games
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- How do equilibrium strategies adjust to skills?



Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks

- Mixed strategies in sports and competitive games
- Be unpredictable
- How do equilibrium strategies adjust to skills?
- Should a kicker who kicks penalty kicks worse to the right than left kick more often to the left than right?



Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks



<i>Kicker/Goalie</i>	<i>Left</i>	<i>Right</i>
<i>Left</i>	0, 1	1, 0
<i>Right</i>	1, 0	0, 1

Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks



<i>Kicker/Goalie</i>	<i>Left</i>	<i>Right</i>
<i>Left</i>	0, 1	1, 0
<i>Right</i>	.75, .25	0, 1

Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks

- In a mixed equilibrium, the goalie's strategy must have the kicker indifferent



Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks



- In a mixed equilibrium, the goalie's strategy must have the kicker indifferent

- p probability goalie goes left; Kicker indifferent: $(1 - p)1 = p \cdot 75$
or $p = 1/1.75 = 4/7$

Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks



- In a mixed equilibrium, the goalie's strategy must have the kicker indifferent
- p probability goalie goes left; Kicker indifferent: $(1 - p)1 = p \cdot 75$
or $p = 1/1.75 = 4/7$
- Goalie goes Left more often than Right (4/7 to 3/7), kicker still goes Left and Right with equal probability


Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks



- In a mixed equilibrium, the goalie's strategy must have the kicker indifferent
- p probability goalie goes left; Kicker indifferent: $(1 - p)1 = p \cdot 75$
or $p = 1/1.75 = 4/7$
- Goalie goes Left more often than Right (4/7 to 3/7), kicker still goes Left and Right with equal probability
- Goalie's strategy adjusts, and the kicker actually adjusts to kick more to their weak side!

Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks

- The Goalie has a slight advantage now, and wins $\frac{4}{7}$ of the time



Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks



- The Goalie has a slight advantage now, and wins $4/7$ of the time

- If the goalie still played equal probability, then the kicker could always go left and win $1/2$ the time instead of $3/7$

Example - Soccer Penalty Kicks



- The Goalie has a slight advantage now, and wins $4/7$ of the time
- If the goalie still played equal probability, then the kicker could always go left and win $1/2$ the time instead of $3/7$
- By adjusting the strategy to keep the kicker indifferent, the Goalie takes advantage of the kicker's weak right kick and wins more often!

Summary - Mixed Strategies - Soccer Penalty Kicks



- A players must be indifferent between the actions he or she randomizes over
- Interesting comparative statics
- Do players really do this?!